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Abstract
This work proposes a factor copula model to quantify systemic risk in financial
institutions. This framework connects to recently trending research on factor copula
modeling and systemic risk measurement. The underlying data are equity returns
of the 28 systemically important financial institutions and a common factor which
is a portfolio being weighted by these SIFIs. Considering a one-factor copula model
with distributional assumptions that enable asymmetric and tail dependence, this
framework provides great fit to the underlying financial data. The estimation of
the copula density expression is accomplished by the Gauss-Legendre quadratures,
a numerical integration and optimization procedure to solve expressions without
analytical solutions. Dependence measures and tail dependence coefficients are ob-
tained based on the factor copula framework and on a nonparametric approach.
Both tail dependence measures, though estimated by a parametric and a nonpara-
metric approach, yield results implying a higher tail dependence among the SIFIs in
2015. Then, this work introduces recognized risk measures which become compared
in their appropriateness in measuring systemic risk. The focus of the chosen risk
measures is to estimates the risk exposure of the financial institutions to the finan-
cial system. Hence, the vulnerability of the individual banks is assessed and results
indicate again increasing exposure in 2015.
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1 Introduction
What severe consequences does distress in the financial system have on the systemically
important financial institutions? Concerning the volatile financial markets over the last
decade, in particular the financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, systemic
risk has emerged as trending topic among the financial sector and regulators. With re-
gards to the Lehman Brothers default and the subsequent turmoil in the banking sector,
the interconnectedness of the financial institutions attracted the attention of the public.
From then on, large and interconnected financial institutions were seen as systemic risk
drivers and the focus of regulators shifted to the arising topics of too-big-to-fail and too-
interconnected-to-fail. While the attention of regulators and risk managers moved on to
an adequate measuring of systemic risk, dependence and risk measures have been studied
in higher frequency.
Risk measures such as Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall became criticized for being
inappropriate approaches on the quantification of systemic risk born by financial institu-
tions. As a result, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and Acharya et al. (2017) introduce
risk measures conditional on distressed events. That are the Conditional Value-at-Risk
(CoVaR) and the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) which hold as more reliable mea-
sures of systemic risk. Further research by Mainik and Schaanning (2014) and Girardi
and Ergün (2013) extend these measures to address different definitions of systemic risk
and to improve their robustness.
Whereas the most common dependence measures concentrate on linear and symmetric
dependence and thus yield inadequate estimations during extreme events. Derived from
variance-covariance estimation a large number of models belong to the correlation-based
approaches which risk quantifications might be an appropriate way under normal mar-
ket conditions but lack under non-normal market behavior. Since such approaches often
assume normality of the risk factors, they misspecify risk by underestimating the depen-
dence between risk factors being in a tail event. In Schmidt and Stadtmüller (2006) tail
dependence measures have been introduced to capture more adequately pairwise depen-
dencies in the tails between financial institutions.
While pairwise dependence measures might not hold as system-wide risk measures that
incorporate simultaneous dependencies within high-dimensional applications, the copula
function offers a flexible and powerful alternative to traditional dependence coefficients.
Joint distribution functions can be decomposed into a copula, containing the entire in-
formation set about the dependence structure, and marginal distributions. This prop-
erty enables flexible constructions for joint distributions by imposing different underlying
distributional assumptions. Furthermore, copulas provide the possibility of multi-stage
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estimation which essentially enhances the computation due to dimension reduction.
In particular when dealing with applications on financial data, the normality and sym-
metry assumptions fail to hold. On the basis of financial applications, the normality
assumption would rule out the dependence of joint tail events and the symmetry assump-
tion would not capture the potentially asymmetric dependence which assigns a higher
likelihood to joint downturns than to upturns. While many approaches are fitting copulas
to two dimensional models, appropriate copulas which are able to model high-dimensional
problems have been revealed by recent research.
Factor models introduced by Krupskii and Joe (2013) became a powerful tool for depen-
dence modeling on systemic risk applications. In past literature on factor copula models
though (He and Gong, 2009), Gaussian frameworks have been employed frequently due
to their attractive feature regarding the estimation of the cumulative distribution func-
tion. While heavy tailed distributions are more suitable to capture the characteristics
of financial data, they are not stable under convolution and even worse, the distribution
does not offer a closed-form solution. Hence, the estimation and corresponding computa-
tion require numerical integration and optimization procedures which distinctly raise the
computational efforts and thus create incentives for dimension reduction.
This work addresses this issue by applying a copula model on a factor structure and im-
posing heavy tailed distributions. Firstly, the distributional assumption allows for tail
dependence within the factor model which secondly, is a powerful tool to reduce dimen-
sions being particularly useful for high-dimensional applications. Moreover, factor models
only reduce the dimensions for the copula estimation while the marginal distributions are
estimated separately within the multi-stage estimation and thus maintain unaffected by
the dimension reduction. Oh and Patton (2017a) provide research on dependence model-
ing under different heavy tailed distributional assumptions. Extensive research on depen-
dence modeling using copulas has been provided by Joe (2014) who applied archimedean
copulas on the factor model. Chen and Nasekin (2017) analyzed systemic risk within a
network-based factor copula which conditions the network model on a central node which
is the most interconnected financial institution. Vrins (2009), Choroś-Tomczyka et al.
(2012) and Chen and Nasekin (2017) are based on double t frameworks enabling tail de-
pendence.
However, this work proposes a skewed distribution to the systemic factor and hence in-
duces asymmetric tail dependence. The structure of the factor model makes the factor
copula being solely determined by the distributions for the common factors and the id-
iosyncratic components. In this work, the underlying financial data are equity returns
of the 28 systemically important financial institutions from pre-crisis period 2007 until
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2015. While the return series of these institutions are used for the idiosyncratic shock, a
portfolio weighted by the respective individual sizes represents the common factor. Hence,
imposing a heavy tailed and skewed distribution to the systemic factor and a symmetric
heavy tailed distributions to the idiosyncratic components results to the desired tail de-
pendence and asymmetry which provides a better fit to the financial data.
Once the one-factor structure is introduced, the conditional copula expression is derived
after applying an uniform transformation method. While this work considers a Maximum
likelihood estimation for the copula density, Oh and Patton (2013) propose the simulated
method of moments estimation method to factor copula models which do not provide
closed-form solutions. Since many heavy tailed copula frameworks are not solvable ana-
lytically, the likelihood expression must be obtained by the means of numerical integration
methods. Thereby, quadrature methods are presumed to yield adequate results. Whereas
Vrins (2009) applied Gauss-Hermite quadratures, which sometimes lack of bounded ap-
proximation errors, Gauss-Legendre quadratures address this issue and are employed by
Oh and Patton (2017b) and Chen and Nasekin (2017). Then, the resulting simulated
returns are the underlying series for the estimations of the risk measures. Thereby, after
obtaining the popular measures of VaR and ES, this approach will focus on the vulnera-
bility of each financial institution to the financial system and hence takes the Exposure
CoVaR approach by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and the Marginal Expected Short-
fall by Acharya et al. (2017) into account. This setting then focuses on the event when
a system-wide shock occurred and investigates the subsequent impact on all financial in-
stitutions based on a simultaneous analysis. Hence, this work follow up to the analysis
of existing research which studied the systemic risk born by institution-specific extreme
tail events and the resulting effect on the financial system. This has been studied by,
among others, Girardi and Ergün (2013), Mainik and Schaanning (2014), Cao (2013) in
a multivariate framework and Chen and Nasekin (2017) in a network-based factor copula
model .
While this work tries to quantify the systemic risk in financial institutions, it examines
dependences structures within the financial system and tail dependencies between the
banks themselves at first and continues to assess the appropriateness of the proposed
risk measures. The dependence within the financial system increases during more volatile
periods as it is implied by the distributional assumptions. Though, results for the most
recent year 2015 show higher dependence again, indicating an increasing interconnected-
ness in the financial system after periods of decreasing dependence structures. In order to
the factor copula parameters and the tail dependence coefficients, clustered dependencies
emerge according to the bank’s region. Hence, the results show relatively low dependence
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from the Asian financial sector on the overall and in particular Western banking sector. In
line with the results on dependencies, the risk measures also yield comprehensible findings
marking crisis periods quite well while they also identify higher individual systemic risk
exposure of all institutions to the financial system in 2015. Thereby, the conditional risk
measures obtain some results that are not yielded by the simple risk measures of VaR and
ES which can be traced back to the different nature of the risk measurement approaches,
such as conditioning on a stressed system. Anyway, the broad consistency of the risk
estimates’ and the dependence measures’ results does not only lead back to the common
model-approach on which the estimates are based on since even the nonparametric tail
dependence supports the other estimates and suggests a higher interconnectedness within
the financial system in 2015.
The structure of this work is constructed as follows. In section 2 basic theory on copulas,
dependence measures and factor model are presented to continue with the construction of
the factor-copula framework. This section on the methodological background is followed
by the estimation part 3 which applies the Maximum Likelihood estimation method to ob-
tain a solution to the copula density estimation. While this framework assumes heavy tail
distributions on the one-factor copula increments, the Maximum Likelihood estimation
requires numerical integration and optimization methods to achieve a solution. Hence,
the subsequent section 3.2 deals with the methodology, computational implementation
and existing research applications on numerical solution methods. Then, the work turns
to the section 4 that discusses the adequacy of prevalent risk measures for estimating sys-
temic risk in financial institutions. Finally, the results section 5 presents useful estimates
to dependencies within the financial system and compares the risk measure estimates in
the course of their appropriateness in quantifying systemic risk and according to their
vulnerability to a shock of the financial system.
4
2 Methodology
This chapter is constructed as follows. First, basic concepts on copula and dependence
measures are introduced. The main part of this chapter deals with the factor copula
model, the implementation of the distributional assumptions and the derivation of the
copula density function.
2.1 Theory on Copula
Consider for the d-variate stochastic process
{
Y
}n
t=1
with Yt = (y1,t, ..., yd,t) the joint
distribution F (y1,t, ..., yd,t) and the corresponding marginal distribution Fi and density
function fi of each variable yi,t.
By Sklar’s Theorem (Sklar, 1959) the joint distribution can be expressed by the dmarginal
distributions which are "coupled" together by a copula function. A d-dimensional copula
is a function C from [0, 1]d → [0, 1] that contains all information about the dependence
structure. Hence,
F (Yt) = C(F1(y1,t), ..., Fd(yd,t)) (1)
Thereby, the copula can be seen as a multivariate distribution function linking marginal
distributions F1, ..., Fd to the joint distribution F . Sklar’s Theorem provides following
practical properties. Firstly, using the given univariate distributions F1, ..., Fd and a cop-
ula C, the theorem allows for the flexible construction of joint distributions F . Secondly,
Sklar’s Theorem enables multi-stage estimation which considerably lower the computa-
tional efforts when dealing with high-dimensional problems. The copula estimation con-
sists of the estimation of the copula parameters θC and the margins Fi, i = 1, ..., d.
Depending on the practical application, the maximum likelihood estimation of the mar-
gins can be accomplished in a non-parametric model, which is in particular appropriate
if the focus is only on the dependence structure, or in a parametric model. Latter one is
more often applied in practical problems in which the entire distribution is of relevance.
When applying the nonparametric approach, the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator
should be proven to yield consistency and asymptotic normality. Within the parametric
procedure, the ML estimation can be accomplished simultaneously for the parameter esti-
mation of the margins and of the copula. This simultaneous (one-stage) estimation is more
efficient than any multi-stage estimation procedure but brings an higher computational
burden for high-dimensional applications (Genest et al., 1995). Thus, this framework
applies the computationally attractive parametric two-stage estimation in which the pa-
rameters of margins are estimated in first stage and the copula parameters in the second
stage.
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Assuming an arbitrary continuous multivariate distribution which can be modeled para-
metrically, the probability integral transform (PIT) can be applied on equation (1) by
imposing ui,t = Fi(yi,t; θm,i), where ui,t ∼ Uniform(0, 1) and θm,i is the vector for all
parameters of margin i. Then, δ is the vector of all marginal parameters for i = 1, ..., d.
Since copulas are invariant under strictly increasing transformations, the PIT used on the
random variables does not affect the copula functions.
C(u1, ..., ud) = F (F
−1
1 (u1), ..., F
−1
d (ud)) (2)
where F−1i is the generalized inverse of Fi. Hence, the copula can be described as a
multivariate distribution with uniform margins and by considering the uniform transforms
for equation (1), the copula density becomes:
c(u1,t, ..., ud,t) =
∂dC(u1, ..., ud)
∂u1...∂ud
(3)
Under the assumptions of a continuous multivariate distribution and a parametric model,
one can also assume by Sklar’s Theorem and by mixture families models the univariate
marginal distribution and the copula to be continuous and parametric. Hence, equation
(1) and (3) can be written as (Franke et al., 2004):
f(Yt) =
d∏
j=1
fi(yi,t) · c(u1,t, ..., ud,t) (4)
where f represents the joint density of Yt. According to equation (4) which consists only
of marginal densities fi and the copula on the right hand side, it becomes obvious that
the copula provides all information regarding the dependence structure.
2.2 Tail Dependence Properties
There are several approaches on the definition of pairwise dependence in random vari-
ables. The most common measures reflect linear and symmetric dependence or consider
the entire distribution. In contrast, dependence can also be defined to be asymmetric,
nonlinear or only consider the tail distribution. Thereby, dependence can be measured in
an empirical way or model-implied (Chen and Nasekin, 2017).
When models with flexible dependence structures are employed, the linear correlation
measure which is natively used under the multinormal assumption needs to become aug-
mented by other dependence measures. The commonly employed linear correlation co-
efficient is not scale invariant and changes due to monotone increasing transformations.
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That is the case because linear correlation is affected by the marginal distribution while
in a copula framework appropriate dependence measures should only depend on the cop-
ula. Due to this property these measures provide information about the degree to which
random variables gather around a monotone function (Joe, 1990).
That is why, an adequate dependence measure for a copula model is scale invariant (see
Nelson 2006) and independent of strictly increasing transformations of the random vari-
ables such as the probability integral transformation which is described earlier in this
framework. Following simulated rank dependence measures are common augmentations
on the linear correlation since they are functions of the copula only (Patton et al., 2012).
Therefore, consider the copula framework with two random variables yi,t and yj,t, their
corresponding marginal distributions Fi and Fj and the copula C.
Spearman’s rank correlation between random variables is measured by using the vari-
ables’ concordance and discordance and can be considered as the linear correlation of the
ranks of the simulated data. The population rank correlation ρ can be written as:
ρ = Corr(ui,t, uj,t) = 12E(ui,t, uj,t)− 3
= 12
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
C(ui, uj)duiduj − 3
where E(u) = 1/2 and V(u) = 1/12 for any random variable u ∼ Uniform(0, 1). Then,
the sample rank correlation ρˆ can be estimated as:
ρˆ =
12
n
n∑
t=1
ui,tuj,t − 3
Kendall’s tau between random variables is obtained by the difference in the probabilities
of concordance and discordance. The Kendall’s tau is calculated by:
τ = 4E(C(ui,t, uj,t))− 1
= 4
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
C(ui, uj)dC(ui, uj)− 1
As Spearman’s and Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients are defined in the interval [-1,1]
the direction of the dependence is given. These both measures may offer the most suit-
able alternatives to the linear correlation measure when dealing with dependence for
non-elliptical distributions (Embrechts et al., 2001).
In contrast to the rank correlation coefficient above, the Quantile dependence focuses
on the dependence in the joint tails of two random variables. It is the conditional prob-
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ability of one variable being in the q-th quantile conditioned that the other variable is
is in the q-th quantile. On the one hand, while obtaining the lower and upper quantile
dependence, information about the symmetry of the dependence structure are provided.
On the other hand, this measure is defined in the interval [0,1] and thus, only shows the
degree of dependence but tells nothing about the direction as the previous coefficients do
(Patton et al., 2012).
Tail dependence is besides Quantile dependence another dependence measure of ex-
treme events. This approach focuses on the upper-right and lower-left quadrant tail of a
bivariate distribution of two random variables and therefore it measures the strength of
dependence in the tails of a bivariate distribution. Since this analysis focuses on measur-
ing risk in the financial markets under severely adverse market conditions the lower tail
dependence coefficient is of higher relevance. In general, the tail dependence is defined
by:
τLij ≡ lim
q→0
P
[
Xi ≤ F−1i (q), Xj ≤ F−1j (q)
]
q
(5)
τUij ≡ lim
q→1
P
[
Xi > F
−1
i (q), Xj > F
−1
j (q)
]
1− q (6)
The lower tail dependence gives the probability that both variables are below their q
quantiles scaled by the probability of one of these variables being below its q quantile for
the lower bound q → 0 (Oh and Patton, 2017a).
Hence, equation (5) and (6) are the limits of the quantile dependence and by embedding
them into a copula framework it takes following form (De Luca and Rivieccio, 2012):
τLij = lim
q→0
C(q, q)
q
(7)
τUij = lim
q→1
1− 2q − C(q, q)
1− q (8)
Whereas the majority of factor-copulas have no closed-form solution, the copula-implied
tail dependence coefficients can be obtained in an analytical way utilizing results from
extreme value theory. Based on the simple linear framework of a factor model the results
for the copula-implied dependence are easy to calculate. Consider the one-factor copula
model from equation (14) and under the assumptions that FZ and F have regularly
varying tails with a common tail index α > 0 and that the copula parameter of each SIFI
bank θ > 0 holds, the tail dependence coefficients are given by equation (9) and (10).
τLij =
min(θi, θj)
αALZ
min(θi, θj)αALZ + A
L
ε
(9)
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τUij =
min(θi, θj)
αAUZ
min(θi, θj)αAUZ + A
U
ε
(10)
where ALZ , AUZ , ALε and AUε are constants which are given by the respective distributions.
Since the implied tail dependencies are conditioned on a selected factor, they are also
named conditional tail dependencies. In this case, the tail dependencies are conditioned
on the systemic factor Z. Note, that the selections of the conditioning factor and the
copula mainly determine the final tail dependencies (Chen and Nasekin, 2017).
According to the factor copula model from equation (14) lower and upper tail dependence
coefficients are obtained if the sign of the copula parameters and the tail index of Z
and ε are the same. The tail dependencies will be different and thus, enables to model
different probabilities of joint market up and down if FZ or Fε is asymmetric (Oh and
Patton, 2017a). Applying a non-normal distribution to the model from equation (14),
the systemic factor may have less weight on the upper tail than on the lower tail whereas
ε is symmetrically distributed (tail index of ε equals lower tail index of Z). Then, the
upper tail dependence from equation (10) equals zero and the lower tail dependence from
equation (9) is positive.
Referring to the one-factor copula model from equation (14), FZ = Skew t(ν, λ) and
Fε = t(ν), the tail indices of Z and ε equal the degrees of freedom ν and the constants
from equation (9) and (10) can be calculated as follow:
ALZ =
bc
ν
(
b2
(ν − 2)(1− λ)2
)−(ν+1)
2
, AUZ =
bc
ν
(
b2
(ν − 2)(1 + λ)2
)−(ν+1)
2
ALε = A
U
ε =
c
ν
(
1
ν − 2
)−(ν+1)
2
where the parameters of the defined distribution are used for a = 4λc(ν − 2)(ν − 1),
b =
√
1 + 3λ2 − a2 and c = Γ(ν+1
2
)/(Γ(ν
2
)
√
pi(ν − 2)) (Oh and Patton, 2017a).
Apart from the copula-implied tail dependence measures above, the tail dependencies
can also be obtained with a non-parametric approach. These measures are widely known
as the empirical tail dependence coefficients. Schmidt and Stadtmüller (2006) propose
to estimate the coefficients by two nonparametric estimation methods, either by using
the empirical tail copula or based on the stable tail-dependence function. Since these
non-parametric estimators apply empirical distribution functions to model the marginal
distributions, it circumstances the lack of possible misidentification arising from a wrong
parametric specification. The non-parametric fit provides also more flexibility by dropping
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the restrictive fashion of a parametric model.
τˆLij :=
n
k
C
(
kxi
n
,
kxj
n
)
≈ 1
k
n∑
t=1
I(R
(t)
i ≤ kxi, R(t)j ≤ kxj) (11)
τˆUij :=
n
k
C˜
(
kxi
n
,
kxj
n
)
≈ 1
k
n∑
t=1
I(R
(t)
i > n− kxi, R(t)j > n− kxj) (12)
where C˜ is the empirical survival copula with F˜i = 1−Fi, k is a threshold parameter and
R denotes the rank of the underlying data x. The very right sides in equation (11) and
(12) show in an approximative framework two rank-order-statistics based on a modified
empirical tail copula. Further details can be found in Schmidt and Stadtmüller (2006).
2.3 The factor copula model
Portfolio models can be distinguished between reduced form models and structural models
to which factor models belong. Factor models have become frequently applied in several
sciences. These models can capture agent’s shared behavior through joint common fac-
tors. When combining variables to a lower number of common factors, factor models
are powerful tools for dimension reduction. Moreover, factor copulas models outperform
other copula classes in terms of their high usefulness for copula parameter estimation
under the curse of dimensionality and time complexity. Introduced by Krupskii and Joe
(2013) factor copulas are explained as a copula framework applied on a factor structure
which enhances high-dimensional estimations and lowers the computational burden due to
a reduced number of parameters (Krupskii and Joe, 2013). This more flexible model set-
ting allows to fit dependence structure more adequately than linear dependence measures
since the copula framework can serve for non-linear and varying dependence structures
among the variables and the common factors.
In general, the multivariate factor copula model presumes a linear dependence structure
of d observed variables Z on p conditional factors W :
Zi =
p∑
k=1
αi,kWk + εi (13)
where W ∼ iid FW (γW ), εi ∼ iid Fε(γε) and Wk ⊥ εi ∀i, k based on d+ p latent variables
(Oh and Patton, 2017a). Thereby, the common factors W are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed. The independence assumption is required by the numerical
optimization procedure when estimating the copula density in section 3. The latter as-
sumption simplifies the estimation by reducing the number of parameters being obtained
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by the numerical integration method. Moreover, the parameters of the common factors’
distributions are assumed to be equal to further mitigate the numerical integration efforts.
However in this work, the factor model from equation (13)(Krupskii and Joe, 2013) re-
duces to one factor p = 1:
Zi = αiW +
√
1− α2i εi (14)
where all assumptions on the distributions FW and Fε from the multiple factor case of
equation (13) stay valid and the vector of the factor copula parameters is defined as
θC = (α1, ..., αd, γ
′
W , γ
′
ε). Now, in order to construct the copula and without any loss of
generality, the margins are defined as i.i.d. random variables and follow Uniform(0, 1).
Hence, the random variables Zi are transformed to conditionally independent uniform
random variables ui ≡ FZi(Zi) given the uniform representation of the common factor
v ≡ FW (W ). Then, using Zi = F−1Zi (ui) and applying the factor model on the copula
function from equation (2), the factor copula writes as follows:
CV (u1, ..., ud) = F (Z1, ..., Zd)
=
∫ 1p
0
FZ|v1,...,vp(Z|v1, ..., vp)dFv(v1)...dFv(vp)
(15)
where FZ|V represents the conditional joint cdf of the vector U on the vector V . After
transforming the p independent variables to uniform random variables, any conditional
independence model is able to fit this form. Considering the univariate factor case p = 1
and under the assumption of independent U ≡ (u1, ..., ud)T , it follows:
Cv(u1, ..., ud) =
∫ 1
0
d∏
i=1
FZi|v(Zi|v)dFv(v)
=
∫ 1
0
d∏
i=1
CFZ(Zi)|v(FZ(Zi)|v)dv
=
∫ 1
0
d∏
i=1
Cui|v(ui|v)dv
(16)
Since ui, v are uniform random variables and Cui,v and cui,v are their joint cdf and density,
it holds that Fui|v(ui|v) = Cui|v(ui|v) = ∂Cui,v(ui,v)∂ v which is used to derive the second
equation above. Equation (16) denotes the factor copula model consisting of a sequence
of bivariate copulas which link the random variables ui to the common factor v. Noting
that ∂ Cui|v(ui|v)
∂ui
=
∂2Cui,v(ui,v)
∂ui∂v
= cui,v(ui, v) and plugging equation (3) into equation (16),
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the one-factor copula density becomes:
c(u1, ..., ud) =
∫ 1
0
d∏
i=1
cui,v(ui, v)dv (17)
According to equation (4) all information about dependence are solely explained by means
of the copula density that due to the just derived one-factor copula equation (17) consists
of d bivariate linking copulas. More details can be found in Krupskii and Joe (2013).
Now, the conditional pair copula will be derived from equation (16) and using the factor
structure from equation (14):
Cui|v(ui|v) = Fui|v(ui|v)
= Fεi
(
F−1Zi (ui)− αiF−1W (v)√
1− α2i
)
(18)
which is the general expression for the conditional independence structure of the uni-
form margins within the factor model. That is, ui are independent with conditioning
variable v (McNeil et al., 2015). Based on the one-factor model from equation (14) the
dependence structure can be modeled in various ways depending on the distributions of
the common factor W and the idiosyncratic component ε. Note that the copula is only
given in closed form solution for FW and Fε being normally distributed. The resulting
multivariate normal distribution has been used by Lu et al. (2015) and Krupskii and Joe
(2013). The closed form solution for normally distributed random variables is a Gaussian
copula. Thus, the dependence structure is determined by the choices of distributions for
W and ε.
Choosing instead heavy tail distributions and an asymmetric one for the common factor
enable tail and asymmetric dependence which will be useful for the later analysis. A
t-copula, for instance, enables joint heavy tails and a higher probability of joint extreme
events in comparison to a Gaussian framework. Oh and Patton (2017a) provided exten-
sive research on factor copula models and show the high degree of adaptability of this
copula class by using normal, t and Skew t marginal distributions to model different de-
pendence structures such as asymmetric and tail dependence. Chen and Nasekin (2017)
applied a double-t copula to a network-based factor model. In contrast to the Gaussian
copula framework, heavy tail and asymmetric factor copulas do not provide a closed form
solution. Considering such distribution for parameter estimation on equation (18), the
solution for distribution FZi is then to compute numerically via convolution of αiW and√
1− α2i εi (Chen and Nasekin, 2017). According to Borak et al. (2011), the double gen-
eralized hyperbolic copula framework suggested by McNeil et al. (2015) and the double
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normal inverse Gaussian copula framework modeled by Kalemanova et al. (2007), which
both belong to the class of generalized hyperbolic distributions, yield the best fit for finan-
cial data. However, modeling tail dependence with generalized hyperbolic distributions
demands restrictive assumptions on the parameters. Apart from the parametric family of
elliptical copulas, Archimedean parametric copulas have been analyzed in factor settings
by recent research from Granger et al. (2006), He and Gong (2009) and Shamiri et al.
(2011) who studied approaches on Gumble, Clayton and Frank copulas. Although, these
Archimedean copulas have the properties of tail dependence and asymmetry and hence
provide a possibly good fit to financial data, they are quite restrictive in high-dimensional
frameworks. That is because the dependence between all random variables can only be
determined by one or two parameters.
This work considers the Skew t− t factor copula proposed by Oh and Patton (2017a) in
order to enable tail dependence and asymmetry and to provide a good fit to the data.
The financial data are stock price returns of 28 banks which are weighted according to
the banks’ sizes to construct a system portfolio as representation of the common factor.
To obtain a measure for systemic risk driven by idiosyncratic risk, the returns of each
bank yi,t are approximated by a GARCH(1, 1) model to isolate the idiosyncratic compo-
nent. This component is cleaned from the GARCH effect by using each bank’s zero mean
returns to exclude the market impact and by standardizing the distribution within the
GARCH(1, 1) framework (Fantazzini, 2008):
yi,t = ai + biym,t + εi,t (19)
h2i,t = ωi + βih
2
i,t−1 + αiε
2
i,t−1 (20)
Zi,t =
√
νi
h2i,t(νi − 2)
εi,t ∼ tνi,λi (21)
where firstly, in the upper equation the bank-specific returns are regressed on the market
returns. Secondly, the regressions’ residuals are controlled for the GARCH effect with one
lag for both elements, the autoregressive and the conditional variance part. Thus, the
obtained idiosyncratic residual returns and the systemic residual returns are presumed
to be iid random variables following a standardized t and a Skew t distribution (Chen
and Nasekin, 2017). The respective variances within the factor copula model are set to
one (Oh and Patton, 2017a). Tail and asymmetric dependence are ensured by applying a
Skew t− t factor copula model.
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First of all, the Skew t density is presented (Hansen, 1994):
f(W |ν, λ) =

bc
(
1 + 1
ν−2
(
bz+a
1−λ
)2)− ν+12
z < −a
b
bc
(
1 + 1
ν−2
(
bz+a
1+λ
)2)− ν+12
z ≥ −a
b
(22)
where
a = 4λc
(ν − 2
ν − 1
)
, b2 = 1 + 3λ2 − a2, c = Γ(
ν+1
2
)√
pi(ν − 2)Γ(ν
2
)
(23)
Γ is the gamma function and the parameters of the t distribution are given by ν and λ
which are the degrees of freedom and the skewness parameter, respectively. By definition,
it holds that ν ∈ (2,∞) and λ ∈ (−1, 1). The Skew t distribution has mean zero and unit
variance. For increasing degrees of freedom ν, the distribution approximates to the normal
distribution and the probability of extreme co-movements decreases. The density function
is left-skewed for λ < 0, symmetric for λ = 0 and right-skewed for λ > 0. For λ = 0 and
ν 6= +∞ it becomes the standardized t distribution and for the extreme case of infinitely
large degrees of freedom the t distribution converges to the normal distribution. Keeping
ν = +∞ but having non-zero skew λ 6= 0 it renders in a skewed normal distribution.
For the sake of simplicity, the degrees of freedom are equal forW and εi and are determined
by the systemic factor. Hence, for a Skew t − t copula model with underlying factor
structure of equation (14) and equal ν for FW and Fε requires to estimate d+2 parameters.
That is, d copula parameters and one degree of freedom and one skewness parameter.
Then, equation (2) gives the multivariate t-copula of the multivariate t-distribution:
Ctν(u1, ..., ud) = T
d
ν (T
−1
1 (u1), ..., T
−1
d (ud)) (24)
where T dν is the multivariate t-distribution and T−1ν is the inverse univariate cumulative
distribution function.
The pair copula representation in equation (18) comes from the specific case of a Gaussian
copula framework in which the derivation is independent from the factor copula parameter
α and hence in a Gaussian framework α denotes nothing more than the linear correlation
coefficient (Krupskii and Joe, 2013). This is given by the convolution stability of the
Gaussian function. The solution to the Gaussian pair copula formulation would then
result analytically since the sum of two Normal variables gives a Normal variable again.
While for the Gaussian formulation (14) remains the same, this simple representation does
not hold anymore in this Skew t− t model though and the distribution is neither stable
under convolution nor provides any analytical solution. The distribution then becomes
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a weighted sum of two unit-variance t-distributed random variables which need to be
standardized such as W .= W (ν)
√
ν−2
ν
and εi
.
= εi(ν)
√
ν−2
ν
for a double t model. Vrins
(2009), Kolman (2014) and Choroś-Tomczyka et al. (2012) express the conditional pair
copula distribution for a double t one-factor model as follows:
Cui|v(ui|v) = Tν
[
Zi − αi
√
ν−2
ν
W√
1− α2j
√
ν−2
ν
]
(25)
where Zi = T−1ν (ui) and W = T
−1
ν,λ (v). Furthermore, with respect to the skew, Chan
and Kroese (2010) present a one-factor copula model expression for a Skew t− t model.
The Skew t - t model within a factor copula framework can also be expressed in terms of
W ∼ iid N(0, 1) and εi ∼ iid N(0, 1):
Zi =
(
αiW + λS +
√
1− α2i εi
)
η−1 (26)
with
S ∼ TN
(
−
√
2
pi
, 1
)
(27)
where TN(µ, σ2) is a truncated normal distribution with left truncated mean −
√
2
pi
. λ > 0
then includes the right-skewed property to the distribution and η−1 is nothing more than
a mathematical construct that brings the t-distributional property into the model such
that η2 ∼ Γ(ν
2
, ν
2
). Anyway, this component can also be understood as shock term which
triggers many simultaneous defaults for small η. This setting under a double t framework
is also considered by Franke et al. (2004) and Chan and Kroese (2010). Due to the
setting of equation (26), Chan and Kroese (2010) show that the distribution of Zi becomes
asymmetric and the skewness is induced by the parameter λ whereas the mean of Zi is not
affected by the term λS. Oh and Patton (2017a), Embrechts et al. (2005) and Lin et al.
(2013) however suggest to include the skew into the factor representation from equation
(14) such as:
Zi = αi
√
ν − 2
ν
W + λ
√
ν − 2
ν
S˜ +
√
(1− α2i )
ν − 2
ν
εi (28)
where S˜ = νV is scalar independent of W with V ∼ χ2ν and thus S˜ ∼ Inv χ2ν (Embrechts
et al., 2005).1 Due to this simple formulation in equation (28) the double t copula model
becomes generalized to allow for an asymmetric distribution triggered by the skewness
1Note that the inverse chi-squared distribution is a special case of the inverse Gamma distribution
from η2 in equation (26) with some restrictions on the Gamma distribution parameters. For more details
on the extension of a double t to a Skew t− t factor model, see Embrechts et al. (2001), Frey and McNeil
(2001) and Oh and Patton (2017a).
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parameter λ (Chan and Kroese, 2010). Applying the distributional assumptions on the
one-factor structure of equation (28) with normal margins, the conditional copula (25)
becomes:
Cui|v(ui|v) = Tν
[
Zi − λ
√
ν−2
ν
S˜ −
√
ν−2
ν
αiW√
1− α2j
√
ν−2
ν
]
(29)
By equation (16) and (29) it follows:
Cv(u1, ..., ud) =
∫ ∞
−∞
d∏
i=1
{
Tν
[
Zi − λ
√
ν−2
ν
S˜ −
√
ν−2
ν
αiW√
1− α2j
√
ν−2
ν
]}
tν(W )dW (30)
For the sake of simplicity, the following sections will stick to the expression introduced by
equation (14) to represent the Skew t− t model under the distributional assumptions of
W ∼ iid TW (ν, λ), εi ∼ iid Tε(ν) where W ⊥ εi ∀i, k. Therefore, Frey and McNeil (2001)
also use the simplified setting of an exchangeable one-factor model for various distribu-
tions. Hence, for the further analysis, the equation (18) is used. This representation for a
Skew t-t framework is also chosen by Yang et al. (2009) and Oh and Patton (2017a) who
use an exchangeable one-factor model representation for the sake of comparison between
the different distributional assumptions in their extensive work on factor copula models.
Azzalini and Capitanio (2003) also apply the notation of the one-factor copula model
structure from equation (14) on skewed elliptical distribution frameworks. Bluhm and
Wagner (2011) employ a mixed distribution approach on the same one-factor model for-
mulation.
The equation (30) has, as already stated above, no closed form solution and the model
implementation is mainly dependent on an accurate integral computation. The copula pa-
rameters are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation employing the Gauss-Legendre
quadrature for numerical integration for the copula density estimation. The next section
will enlarge upon the factor copula density estimation by numerical integration method.
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3 Estimation of the factor copula model
In general, the estimation of a multivariate distribution based on a copula can be ac-
complished in only one step that includes the estimation of the copula parameters θC
and the estimation of the margins Fi with i = 1, ..., d. However, as mentioned in section
2.1, Sklar’s Theorem also allows for multi-stage estimation which provides advantages
for the computation in terms of high-dimensionality. The applied maximum likelihood
estimations furthermore can be embedded in parametric and nonparametric models for
the margins. Thereby, the entire distribution is considered for parametric models, that
are the full maximum likelihood estimation and the inference for margins method which
are one-step and two-step procedures, respectively. The one-step simultaneous estima-
tion procedure achieves consistent and efficient estimators but calls for high numerical
complexity under high dimensionality since the simultaneous method jointly estimates
the marginal and the copula parameters. Semi- and nonparametric estimation methods
for the margins are quite suitable if the interest is merely on the dependence structure
and to avoid a parametric restriction to the unknown marginal distributions. Then, the
multi-stage semiparametric method, that is the pseudo maximum likelihood, also canon-
ical maximum likelihood, obtains nonparametric estimates for the marginal distributions
by applying empirical distribution functions and thus, enables the estimates to be inde-
pendent of restrictive parametric families. After that, the dependence structure between
the margins is obtained by using a parametric copula estimation for the uniformly trans-
formed pseudo sample (Kim et al., 2007). As shown by results of Genest et al. (1995)
the simultaneous estimation of the full maximum likelihood is preferred over two-stage
solutions, although the pseudo maximum likelihood estimator becomes consistent and
asymptotically efficient under certain conditions.
In this framework, the estimation of the factor copula model is carried out with a multi-
stage maximum likelihood that requires the log-likelihood function of the one-factor cop-
ula model to become decomposed into two components. This is necessary to enhance
the computational performance in high-dimensional problems. Next the estimators are
presented before the standard errors will be obtained. Finally, a numerical integration
and optimization procedure for maximum likelihood is applied to achieve an expression
for the factor copula density (17). Thereby, the estimation of the cumulative distribution
function proceeds the inverse distribution function estimation which can be calculated af-
terwards numerically (Vrins, 2009). Now, suppose under the copula density from equation
(17) belongs to a parametric family C = {Cθ, θC ∈ ΘC} and considering equation (4) and
the parameter vector θ = (θm,1, ..., θm,d, θC)′ ∈ Rd+1, the likelihood function is written as
follows:
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L(y1, ..., yn; θ) =
n∏
t=1
f(y1,t, ..., yd,t; θm,1, ..., θm,d, θC) (31)
Now, the likelihood function (31) must be decomposed into two components, the likelihood
contributions from the marginal distributions and from the dependence structure (Choroś
et al., 2010). The decomposed log-likelihood function is given by:
l(y1, ..., yn; θm, θC) = lm(θm) + lC(θC , θm) (32)
which can be rewritten as:
l(y1, ..., yn; θm, θC) =
n∑
t=1
d∑
i=1
log fi(yi,t; θm,i)
+
n∑
t=1
log c(F1(y1,t; θˆm,1), ..., Fd(yd,t; θˆm,d); θC)
(33)
where the estimation of the parameters for the uniform margins takes place at first stage
and for the copula parameters at second stage with the marginal parameters fixed at the
estimates from the first estimation stage. The log-likelihood for the marginal distributions
is further decomposed into d log-likelihood expressions for d margins. The resulting
estimates for θm are required for the copula parameter estimation since the probability
integral transforms are derived using the marginal parameters. The first stage estimation
to obtain the d parameters of the marginal distributions is given by:
θˆm,i = argmax
θm,i
lm,i(θm,i) (34)
The factor copula density in the second stage has no analytical solution for the distri-
butional assumptions made in this framework. Hence, the log-likelihood of the copula
model is solved via a numerical integration method which will be discussed later in sec-
tion 3.2. Given the estimated marginal parameters θˆm = (θˆm,1, ..., θˆm,d)′ the dependence
parameters solve the pseudo log-likelihood function lC(θC , θˆm) at second stage:
θˆC = argmax
θC
lC(θC , θˆm,i) (35)
Except for the particular case of a multivariate Gaussian copula with normal marginal
distributions, the inference for margins estimators differ from the efficient and consistent
maximum likelihood estimator (Choroś et al., 2010). Although, this two-stage estimation
procedure results in less efficient estimators than the full maximum likelihood method,
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Joe (1997) argued that the modest loss in efficiency is tolerable compared to the benefits
from the material reduction of the computational efforts.
3.1 The factor copula density
By applying non-gaussian marginals to the factor copula approach the likelihood function
will most likely not yield a closed form solution for the factor copula density of equation
(16) and (18). Oh and Patton (2016) derived a computationally feasible representation
for the copula density:
c(u1, ..., ud; θ) =
fZ(F
−1
Z1
(u1), ..., F
−1
Zd
(ud))
fZ1(F
−1
Z1
(u1))·, · · · , ·fZd(F−1Zd (ud))
(36)
Based on an one-factor model, the component of equation (36) can be found by the
derivation of fZ(Z1, . . . , Zd), F−1Zi (ui) and fZi(Zi) which only requires to presume the
independence between the common factor W and the idiosyncratic component εi. Then,
the joint density, the marginal distribution and density of Zi are given by fZi , FZi and
fZ, respectively and can be derived using (16) and (18):
fZi|W (Zi|W ) = fεi
(
Zi − αiF−1W (v)√
1− α2i
)
, (37)
FZi|W (Zi|W ) = Fεi
(
Zi − αiF−1W (v)√
1− α2i
)
, (38)
fZ|W (Z1, ..., Zd|W ) =
d∏
i=1
fεi
(
Zi − αiF−1W (v)√
1− α2i
)
. (39)
To obtain the marginals, the conditional distributions are now integrated w.r.t. the
common factor W = F−1W (v) (Oh and Patton, 2017b):
fZi(Zi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fi
(
Zi − αiW√
1− α2i
)
dW, (40)
and analogously for FZi(Zi) and fZ:
FZi(Zi) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Fεi
(
Zi − αiW√
1− α2i
)
dW, (41)
fZ(Z1, ..., Zd) =
∫ ∞
−∞
d∏
i=1
fεi
(
Zi − αiW√
1− α2i
)
dW. (42)
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Krupskii and Joe (2013) stated that the integrand could be unbounded since for many
parametric copula families the copula density becomes infinitely large as the uniform
random variables ui, v approach the boundaries 0 or 1. Joe (2014) argued in this regard
that the integrand is an integrable function. Since the numerical integration method will
estimate the inverse distribution of the uniform random variable, it writes Zi = F−1Zi (ui)
with the uniform representation of the common factor v = FW (W ):
fZi(Zi) =
∫ 1
0
fεi
(
F−1Zi (ui)− αiF−1W (v)√
1− α2i
)
dv, (43)
FZi(Zi) =
∫ 1
0
Fεi
(
F−1Zi (ui)− αiF−1W (v)√
1− α2i
)
dv, (44)
fZ(Z1, ..., Zd) =
∫ 1
0
d∏
i=1
fεi
(
F−1Zi (ui)− αiF−1W (v)√
1− α2i
)
dv. (45)
Inserting the derived joint density fZ, marginal distribution FZi and density fZi into
the copula density (36), the resulting implied copula density is now computationally
feasible for the numerical integration procedure to achieve solutions for the maximum
likelihood estimation:
c(u1, ..., ud; θ) =
∫ 1
0
d∏
i=1
fεi
(
F−1Zi (ui)−αiF
−1
W (v)√
1−α2i
)
dv
∫ 1
0
fε1
(
F−1Z1 (u1)−α1F
−1
W (v)√
1−α21
)
dv·, · · · , ·
∫ 1
0
fεd
(
F−1Zd (ud)−αdF
−1
W (v)√
1−α2d
)
dv
(46)
Although, the copula density spans over d dimensions, the numerical integration circum-
vents an high-dimensionality optimization by only taking the integral over the common
factor. Thus, the integrals from the implied copula density with one common factor (46)
are obtained from one-dimensional numerical integration on the interval [0, 1] (Oh and
Patton, 2017b).
3.2 Numerical Integration
Numerical integration is a widely encountered problem in mathematical science. The
general concept is to approximate a definite integral by a weighted sum of function values
at points within the interval of integration. Thereby, these basic quadrature methods can
be divided into two wide classes regarding the distance between the data points. While
the first class of methods, these are Newton-cotes formulas, distributes the data points
equidistantly, the second class of methods distributes the data points unequally over the
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interval. The latter methods belong to more efficient Gaussian quadrature techniques
which are based on the orthogonal polynomial approach to functional approximation of
the following quadrature problem:
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)dx '
q∑
k=0
ωkf(xk) (47)
where the quadrature nodes are denoted by xk ∈ [a, b], their quantities by q and the
corresponding quadrature weights by wk. Hence, this approach mainly differ by the nodes
at which the function is evaluated and by the weights which are assigned to each function
value. The precision of the approximation is subject to the choice of the quadrature nodes
xk and weights ωk. In general, Gaussian quadrature chooses the weights and nodes such
that the approximation is exact for a low order polynomial f . In fact, the approximation
error becomes strictly zero for every polynomial f being of order less than 2q (Vrins,
2009). The most common Gaussian quadrature methods are the Gauss-Chebyshev, the
Gauss-Legendre, the Gauss-Hermite and the Gauss-Laguerre formula.
Considering such a quadrature formula for the numerical integration method applied on
the equations (43), (44) and (45), the problem takes a one-dimensional fashion whereas
it becomes a multivariate numerical integration for multi-factor models. In this case,
multivariate integrals need to be computed and the nodes and weights are obtained by
Kronecker product. Krupskii and Joe (2013) and Oh and Patton (2017b) used Gauss-
Legendre quadrature for the numerical integration and optimization for the maximum
likelihood estimation. Vrins (2009) computed Gauss-Hermite quadratures to a problem
on a double-t factor copula framework. However, the Gauss-Hermite quadrature might
obtain non-finite error bounds for such framework which contains integrands taking un-
bounded values. The Gauss-Legendre quadrature provides bounded approximation errors
(Kahaner et al., 1989). Oh and Patton (2017b) compared numerical integration proce-
dures for a normal factor copula with 10, 50 and 150 nodes with the closed-form likelihood
results which relates to∞ nodes The paper found that the accuracy for 50 and 150 nodes
does not differ much from the analytical solution while the error increases for only a small
number of nodes. Joe (2014) proposed a number of quadrature nodes per dimension of
q = 20 − 30 to be optimal with respect to a numerically stable maximum likelihood es-
timation. Chen and Nasekin (2017) found out empirically that q = 21 maximizes the
likelihood of their model.
Based on existing literature on numerical procedures for factor copula models using t
distributions, this framework will apply the Gauss-Legendre quadrature to solve the nu-
merical integration problem for the integrals of (43), (44) and (45). The quadrature nodes
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are obtained by the roots of the Legendre polynomial which belongs to the family of or-
thogonal polynomials. This framework benefits from the use of orthogonal polynomials
that enhance the computational speed and allow for high non-linearities. The roots of the
orthogonal Legendre polynomial can be calculated by a root finding procedure, such as the
Newton-Raphson method. This linear approximation of the function f(x) is performed by
a succession of linear functions. Among the root finding procedures, the Newton Raph-
son method is often the fastest method and also easy to implement in a multidimensional
setting. Then the weights are given by the obtained nodes and the Legendre polynomial
(Judd, 1998).
Applied on this model, values of FZi(u;αi) can be calculated by using the Newton-Raphson
root finding method that runs the iteration until the latest obtained points are within a
threshold of the previous points (Judd, 1998). The inverse cdf F−1Zi must be estimated
in order to obtain the solutions to the Gauss-Legendre quadrature. The numerical in-
tegration and optimization for maximum likelihood of equation (31) can now obtain the
parameters θ of the joint density c(u1,t, ..., ud,t; θ) from (36):
L(u1, ..., un; θ) =
n∏
t=1
c(u1,t, ..., ud,t; θ) (48)
For the estimation of the inverse cdf, xk from equation (47) is distributed on a grid
on the interval [xmin, xmax] and quadrature nodes are q = 21. The inverse of FZi can be
determined by evaluating FZi for the uniform random variable u and the copula parameter
vector αi at each point of the two grids each having 100 grid points on the intervals
[0, 1] and [−1, 1], respectively (Chen and Nasekin, 2017). Finally, to obtain all values
for the inverse cdf, piecewise cubic interpolation is applied in each maximum likelihood
estimation iteration. Since the values of F−1Zi (u;αi) are only estimated once before the
maximum likelihood estimation, it reduces essentially the computational burden.
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4 Measuring systemic risk in a factor-copula framework
This analysis considers a weighted portfolio from the systemically important financial
institutions to be an adequate representation for systemic risk. This section first presents
a selection of popular and acknowledged risk measures. In further analysis, a scenario will
be constructed which sets the model representation of the financial system under distress.
Based on the stressed systemic factor, further risk measures will be derived to quantify
systemic risk in specific institutions.
4.1 Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall
Firstly, the most common and applied measure for quantifying risk is presented by the
Value-at-Risk which is widely used among financial regulation institutions and the private
financial sector. In line with the literature the risk measures in this section are defined
traditionally as estimates of the historical returns yi,t. In this work however, the risk
measures are taken based on the SIFI and system returns modeled by the one-factor
copula model from equation (14). The VaR of the random variable yi,t is given by the
q-quantile of a return series:
P(yi,t ≤ V aRiq) = q (49)
Hence, the VaR measures the maximal negative return of an underlying return series over
a certain time period conditioned on a significance level q. There are several classifications
to distinguish the estimation methods on VaR. The VaR estimation can be accomplished
non- or parametrically, model-based or historically. Common methods estimate on basis of
model-based approaches or by historical simulation. While analytical methods imposing
distributional assumptions such as the Delta-Normal approach are simple to implement,
they might lead to highly misspecified results. Its weakness mainly sources from the
parametric fashion of setting a distributional assumptions on the underlying returns. The
Monte-Carlo simulation also restricts the model to a parametric setting assuming a dis-
tribution on which a large-number simulation is run. The historical simulation belongs
to the nonparametric approaches since it considers the empirical distribution and is asso-
ciated with less computational efforts than the time-consuming Monte-Carlo simulation
(Hull, 2006).
In this work, the VaR, based on equation (49), is a quantile of empirical distributions of
return series. The drawback of the VaR as risk measure lies in the missing information on
the values which exceed the VaR estimate. The Expected Shortfall addresses this issue
and has become a popular risk measure which might deliver more adequate information on
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the risk of a return series of financial institutions than the VaR.2 The Expected Shortfall,
also refered to Conditional Value at Risk or Tail Loss, is defined as the mean over the
returns once the VaR is exceeded and hence can be written as follows (Hull, 2006):
ESiq = E[yi,t|yi,t < V aRiq] (50)
This alternative to the VaR is subject to a higher sensitivity to the tail of the distribution.
Anyway, both risk measures only give an isolated measurement of risk of each bank
separately. This work focuses on measuring systemic risk in financial institutions and
therefore, extended risk measures will be introduced.
4.2 Systemic risk measures
Apart from the above isolated risk measure for individual banks, conditional risk measures
are introduced which can be estimated using conditional distributions to identify the risk
exposure of banks to the system and the impact from banks on the system.
4.2.1 CoVaR
CoVaR means "conditional, contagion or comovement" VaR and is defined as the VaR of
the whole financial system given institution i being under stress. Taking the difference
between the CoVaR conditional on bank i’s distress and the CoVaR conditional on the
median state of bank i results in ∆CoVaR, the marginal impact of institution i to the
financial system when institution i moves from median state into distress. This measure
was introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) who claim the existing risk measures,
on the one hand, to neglect negative spillover effects by institutions on the system and
on the other hand, to render in misleading results while mainly focusing on simultaneous
price evolutions. Based on this criticism, their proposed systemic risk measures addresses
the issue of the backward-looking fashion of the VaR by employing idiosyncratic elements
such as the institutions’ sizes, leverages and equity market beta.
Moreover, the ∆CoVaR extends the usual risk measures which only quantify individual
risk by measuring the impact on a predefined financial system. They argue that relying
on potentially misleading risk estimation based on isolated risk measures of institutions
misspecifies the true institution-inherent risk and allows these institutions to excessively
accumulate risk. However, the VaR measure might last for the case in which the CoVaR
measures run proportionally to the VaR. According to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008),
2Moreover, in contrast to the ES the VaR is not a coherent risk measure since it lacks in the subad-
ditivity condition. That is, the VaR of the sum of a selection of portfolios is higher than the sum of the
single portfolio VaRs. For more on the conditions for coherent risk measures, see Franke et al. (2004).
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there is no empirical evidence that the ∆CoVaR can be linked to a scaled VaR estimate.
In contrast, they show the weak dependence between individual VaR estimates and their
∆CoVaR measure. Apart from the contribution to the systemic risk, this risk measure also
provides the flexibility to analyze the institution i’s risk impact on other institutions which
directly addresses to the widely discussed issue of the interconnectness in the financial
system. More precise, the CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) is given by:
P(yj,t ≤ CoV aRj|C(yi,t)q |C(yi,t)) = q (51)
where yj,t denotes the returns of institution j (or the entire financial system) and C(yi,t)
some event of institution i. C(yi,t) usually represents a stressed event of institution i, such
as yi,t = V aRiq. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) also analyze the case in which j stands
for the financial system. Hence, the CoVaR measures the VaR of the financial system
conditional on the bank specific returns being equal to the bank’s VaR. The ∆CoVaR of
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) is then calculated by:
∆CoV aRj|iq = CoV aR
j|yi,t=V aRiq
q − CoV aRj|yi,t=V aRi0.5q (52)
where CoV aRj|yi,t=V aR
i
0.5
q represents the VaR of the financial system conditional on the
median state of institution i. Besides the quantile regression approach of Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2008), this CoVaR measure was investigated in a comparative analysis by
Benoit et al. (2013) and within a copula framework by Reboredo and Ugolini (2015). Re-
lated to the CoVaR measure between different institutions, Claessens and Forbes (2001)
use a multivariate GARCH model to study volatility spillovers. Based on the idea of
Hartmann et al. (2004) which provide research on contagion measures during crisis pe-
riods, Mainik and Schaanning (2014) choose another distress condition which addresses
a more severe risk event for C(yi,t) where yi,t ≤ V aRiq. While Mainik and Schaanning
(2014) extend the CoVaR analysis of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008), they show that
a higher dependence parameter is associated with higher systemic risk. This is a result
of the different approach for the conditioning distress event and was not found by the
CoVaR approach of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008). Girardi and Ergün (2013) provide
an extensive research on ∆CoVaR and their backtesting results for the period from 2000
until 2008 among the US financial sector suggest to include kurtosis and skewness into
the model. Furthermore, Cao (2013) presents Multi-CoVaR to advance the systemic risk
contribution measure for several institutions moving contemporaneously in distress. A
further approach on Multi-CoVaR using time series processes has been implemented by
recent research of Bernardi et al. (2013). Important contribution to the risk measure liter-
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ature is provided by Engle and Manganelli (2004) who propose the CAViaR approach - a
sort of dynamic setting of the CoVaR model using a GARCH process on the time variant
tail distribution of return series. The literature on systemic risk rather focuses on the risk
contribution of each institute to the financial system which is approached by ∆CoVaR.
While the effect of a market downturn requires to estimate the systemic contribution to
each individual institution
4.2.2 Exposure CoVaR
This work will continue with the CoVaR approach conditioning on the financial system
being in distress to study the impact of a financial crisis on each institution. Hence,
∆CoV aR
i|ym,t
q of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) is called Exposure ∆CoVaR with ym,t
being the market returns. The Exposure ∆CoVaR thus gives the VaR of each institution
i conditional on the financial system moving from median to distressed state:
∆CoV aRi|mq = CoV aR
i|ym,t=V aRmq
q − CoV aRj|ym,t=V aRm0.5q (53)
This measure is more akin to the factor-copula model of this work which imposes the
financial system returns as common systemic factor to all institutions. Since the Exposure
∆CoVaR measures the impact of a market downturn on each institution, it can be seen
as the individual institution’s vulnerability to a switching state of the system which is
one focus of this work.
Pagano and Sedunov (2014) provide an empirical analysis and show that the total systemic
risk exposure of banks increases with the sovereign debt yields in Europe. Risk managers
and regulators may utilize the Exposure ∆CoVaR measure which is a complement for
stress testing in individual institutions. Löffler and Raupach (2016) critically reviewed
the imposed measures of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and pointed out some caveats
which come along with these risk measures contingent on the distributional assumption,
the estimation method and the underlying data.
4.2.3 Marginal Expected Shortfall
Based on the expected shortfall from equation (50), Acharya et al. (2017) introduce a
measure which offer a linkage between losses of the entire financial system and the cor-
responding contribution from each institution. The marginal expected shortfall (MES)
calculates the mean over the individual institution’s returns conditional on the system
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returns being below a certain threshold:
MESiq = E[yi,t|ym,t ≤ V aRmq ] (54)
Hence, it measures the bank i’s losses when the financial system is in severe distress.
Acharya et al. (2017) firstly apply the MES on institution-wide level which is particularly
useful for institution-internal risk management that might aim to quantify the maximal
potential losses of a single department occurring from a stressed state of the entire bank.
Then, this MES can be scaled up to the entire financial system attempting to measure
systemic risk and the exposure of each bank to the state of the financial system. Con-
sidering the bank i’s sizes relative to the entire financial system, the MES can also be
expressed as the derivative of entire financial system’s expected shortfall with respect to
a bank i’s relative size ωi (Acharya et al., 2017):
MESiq =
∂ESmq
∂ωi
=
∂(
∑d
i=1 ωiE[yi,t|ym,t ≤ V aRmq ])
∂ωi
(55)
which results in the expression from equation (54). ESmq denotes the expected shortfall
for the entire financial system which can be constituted as sum of the weighted individual
expected shortfall estimates.
Löffler and Raupach (2016) offer an analytical approach on the consistency and robustness
of various newly trending return-based systemic risk measures such as the introduced
CoVaR, Exposure ∆CoVaR and MES. According to a linear factor model, Löffler and
Raupach (2016) find that the Exposure ∆CoVaR and the MES become substitutes within
a linear model of normally distributed random variables and only differ by a usually
small constant. They continue with an analysis of the direct effects of size, systemic and
idiosyncratic risk on the risk measures and show some caveats which might raise incentives
for further research and extensions on these risk measures.
Whereas the MES considers system returns to identify a crisis period, Oh and Patton
(2017a) advance the measure of Brownlees and Engle (2016) by proposing the "kES"
which measures the ES of a bank i conditional on a group of k banks being in distress:
kESiq = E[yi,t|(
d∑
j=1
1{yj,t < C(yj,t)}) > k] (56)
In the analysis of Oh and Patton (2017a) the kES estimates rank higher than the overall
MES. This measure can be of particular interest for periods where distress mainly oc-
27
curred at geographical distinct institutions among the SIFI banks. Although, the MES
is doubted to hold as powerful tool for systemic risk measurement in practice among the
financial industry and regulators, Idier et al. (2014) suggest to employ this measure es-
pecially on very large financial institutions. This work will focus on the MES and the
Exposure ∆ CoVaR as extended systemic risk measures for individual institutions condi-
tional on a distressed financial system.
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5 Results
This section firstly will describe the underlying data. Then, results on the univariate
properties of the data will be presented such as the distribution parameters. Next, de-
pendence parameters calculated with an purely empirical and a conditional copula-based
approach will be compared. This part will also include copula dependence parameters
obtained by the numerical integration procedure. At the end, this work will focus on risk
measure estimated in isolation or conditional on the systemic factor.
5.1 Data and univariate analysis
This systemic risk analysis focuses on a definition of systemic risk inherent in the sys-
temically important financial institutions. The underlying data contains the daily return
series of 28 financial institutions over the time range between 01 January 2007 and 31
December 2015. Only commercial banks that are declared as systemically important fi-
nancial institutions by the Financial Stability Board in Basel are considered within the
data set. Some Institutions, though declared as SIFI bank, are not included in the data
since they either dropped out or joined the status of a SIFI bank during the observed time
interval. The remaining 28 daily return series are constructed into a portfolio weighted
according to each bank’s size which is measured here as the market capitalization. The
resulting portfolio is then the representation of the financial system. All banks and their
corresponding characteristics such as their average size included in this analysis are shown
in table 7. Among the observed SIFI banks, there are eight banks from the USA, four
banks from the United Kingdom, three Chinese and Japanese, respectively and the ten
largest European banks. While the SIFI status has been assigned to these 28 banks, three
banks lost this status within the sample period due to declining systemic importance:
Dexia, Commerzbank and Lloyds.
While the application of market return data for risk modeling in copula models is the
benchmark in current and up-to-now research, the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market
has grown sharply over the last two decades and thus enhances the practical capability of
CDS spread data for quantitative research. Creal and Tsay (2015) use CDS spreads and
stock returns to model a stochastic factor copula model. Data on CDS spreads were also
employed by Oh and Patton (2017b) and Christoffersen et al. (2013) for dynamic copula
models to assess system risk and credit risk, respectively. Due to the higher practical
applicability of CDS spreads, the research on systemic risk and default probabilities has
been shifting attention to CDS spread data (Dittmar, 2010). However, equity returns are
still in highly frequent use for the mentioned research fields, such as in Oh and Patton
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Figure 1: Density and scatter plots of the 2008 daily returns of Bank of America, Citi-
group, Bank of China, Unicredit and ING Group
(2017a), Chen et al. (2017) and Acharya et al. (2017). He and Gong (2009) present a
theoretical background to the application of equity prices on risk analyses. Based on the
definition for the value of a company, the default event is defined as a company’s disability
to pay its debt rate with its equity returns.
To motivate an analysis on dependence measures, figure 1 plots the daily return series
from the crisis period 2008 for two US American banks, that are the Bank of America and
Citigroup and two European banks, that are Unicredit and the ING Group and, for the
sake of comparability, the Bank of China. The plot clearly shows the geographical dif-
ference in the empirical dependence structures between the five banks. The scatter plots
between the Bank of America and Citigroup strongly shows high empirical dependence
in the tails. Same holds for the both European banks. While the Bank of China barely
expresses any stronger dependence patterns with the US and European banks, the scat-
ter plot with Unicredit fluctuates on higher level than with the both US banks. Surely,
the plot also indicates dependence between the US and European banks. In general, the
plotted univariate densities exhibit a leptokurtic shape suggesting heavy tails.
From figure 1 one can derive that the return series are not normally distributed in many
years which is usual for financial data. After cleaning for non-zero means in the time
series, the data are filtered by a GARCH process (cp. equation (19)) to control for lags
in the conditional mean and volatility. Then, obtaining the iid standardized residuals for
each SIFI, their marginal parameters can be estimated on basis of the Skew t distribution
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with density from equation (22). The estimated skewness parameters for the standard-
ized residuals are displayed in table 1 which shows skewness parameters close to zero on
average.
Index (SIFI) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1(JPM) 3.784 7.288 5.925 9.130 7.744 4.519 7.025 4.481 13.017
2(BAC) 3.623 5.220 4.679 6.416 6.261 11.851 4.831 6.470 8.066
3(BKM) 4.591 4.973 4.953 4.328 7.187 7.246 6.387 5.970 4.869
4(CITI) 3.572 6.791 4.879 8.996 5.165 8.813 12.028 5.144 5.731
5(GS) 5.482 4.473 4.940 4.547 5.688 5.908 8.828 26.640 9.388
6(MS) 4.453 4.076 4.120 18.297 5.528 12.373 5.639 45.875 6.911
7(SST) 4.309 5.023 4.076 6.919 5.209 3.883 3.964 5.603 4.934
8(WFC) 3.578 4.089 5.293 6.658 6.800 4.994 7.627 17.341 7.236
9(RBS) 9.353 3.771 5.657 8.036 8.556 9.705 6.252 4.731 8.512
10(BAR) 15.458 6.154 4.723 15.857 8.453 4.062 6.074 4.069 5.850
11(HSBC) 8.654 4.074 6.850 4.373 8.035 4.039 6.245 16.816 5.361
12(STAN) 9.718 4.604 5.668 8.276 6.705 5.514 5.773 4.282 4.394
13(BOC) 4.589 5.267 7.468 25.035 4.486 7.677 4.724 4.357 4.469
14(ICBC) 4.724 5.789 10.044 12.163 6.490 8.280 3.977 3.959 4.465
15(CCB) 12.007 7.916 21.386 11.611 9.003 15.207 3.801 5.356 4.926
16(BNP) 5.959 5.247 6.910 5.942 14.951 5.474 8.609 14.185 12.855
17(ACA) 10.487 5.591 6.346 6.790 8.224 10.121 9.341 9.336 4.664
18(GLE) 8.826 5.211 8.836 5.782 10.479 8.308 7.328 11.375 6.261
19(DB) 4.122 5.692 4.970 7.748 8.286 7.493 18.149 9.694 6.130
20(UCG) 6.029 5.652 33.437 5.352 28.937 5.213 8.566 10.969 6.407
21(ING) 299.770 6.273 7.213 6.788 22.105 10.250 10.927 7.960 15.898
22(SAN) 9.721 6.838 8.182 4.796 7.772 8.212 8.780 9.719 6.076
23(NDA) 6.282 5.112 12.327 6.996 5.880 7.463 10.425 4.430 4.743
24(CS) 5.148 6.538 66.054 4.950 5.515 5.144 5.017 11.448 3.810
25(UBS) 8.276 6.795 18.033 5.010 9.375 4.692 4.576 3.984 5.598
26(MTU) 10.684 12.367 4.088 7.039 7.010 50.139 4.660 9.960 5.524
27(MFG) 4.094 11.991 4.181 4.564 5.224 20.987 3.893 4.915 3.650
28(SMFG) 4.276 12.584 4.088 4.682 6.784 44.558 5.401 5.260 4.689
Average νi 17.199 6.264 10.190 8.110 8.638 10.790 7.102 9.797 6.587
System ν 10.802 4.866 7.543 4.426 19.080 9.218 13.332 42.925 6.189
Average λi -0.013 0.048 -0.017 0.001 -0.027 0.044 -0.010 -0.032 -0.034
λsys -0.219 0.001 -0.134 0.001 -0.103 -0.002 -0.180 -0.128 -0.070
Note: This table presents the degree of freedom parameters for each SIFI from 2007
to 2015, the corresponding averages and skewness parameter averages and both
marginal parameters for the systemic factor.
Table 1: Marginal Parameters
In contrast to the idiosyncratic residuals, the system returns show skewness support-
ing the Skew t distributional assumption for the later simulated returns. Furthermore,
the degrees of freedom for all SIFI banks and the systemic factor are shown in table 1.
For most banks the degrees of freedom during the observed periods are fluctuating on
relatively low level indicating heavy-tailed distributions. While the year 2012 contains
relatively higher levels of degrees of freedom, such as for the Japanese banks (38.56 on
average) and Morgan Stanley (12.37), those historical return series are probably exposed
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to lighter tails than other banks’ returns. Similar pattern can be detected for 2014 when
Goldman Sachs (26.64), Morgan Stanley (45.88) and Barclays (16.82) show relatively
lighter tail behavior based on their historical returns. During the periods from 2007 until
2009 including the financial crisis, the average degrees of freedom for US banks fluctuate
around five suggesting heavy tails. This level is also reached by British and European
SIFI banks during 2008 and by the Japanese banks in 2009. After years of slightly higher
degrees, the levels fell again, partially sharply, in 2015. However, analyzing the marginal
parameters of historical return series holds only as a description of the bank-specific char-
acteristics but cannot offer significant insights on the actual dependence of SIFI banks on
the system.
The next section will focus on dependence approaches measuring firstly, the dependence
structure between the banks with empirical tail dependence and copula-implied tail depen-
dence coefficients and secondly, the dependence between the SIFI banks and the financial
system.
5.2 Results on dependence measures
The first part of this section deals with empirical tail dependence coefficients which mea-
sure dependence structures among the SIFI banks for extreme events. The second measure
of this section is the copula-implied tail dependence. Both measures have been explained
in section 2.2. Thirdly, the factor copula parameters from equation (14) obtained through
the numerical integration on the maximum likelihood estimation (48) are presented.
Referring to the large variation of the marginal parameters in table 1, the marginal distri-
butions of the SIFIs seem to be exposed to a certain heterogeneity in their distributional
shapes, motivating the analysis to shift the focus to a non-parametric approach which
circumvents the danger of a misspecified distributional assumption. That is why, this
work now observes the non-parametric dependence measure of Schmidt and Stadtmüller
(2006), that is the empirical lower tail dependence coefficient from equation (11). It mea-
sures the strength of the bivariate empirical dependence in the tails between two SIFIs
on the interval [0, 1]. The results for all nine years are plotted in figure 5. While the
empirical lower tail dependence coefficients increased from 2007 to 2008, the dependence
reduces considerably in the after crisis periods. That goes hand in hand with the develop-
ment at the interbank market after the fall of Lehman Brothers when banks hugely pulled
down connections to other banks to isolate from counterparty risk. In 2011 facing the
sharpening of the European sovereign debt crisis, the tail dependence peaked again when
especially the coefficients between the US and the European SIFIs rose sharply near 1.
In general across all years of the sample, the tail dependence is subject to the geograph-
32
ical origin of the banks. Hence, the tail dependence within each of the five geographical
clusters can be clearly distinguished from cross-geographical coefficients, though the coef-
ficients for the US, UK and European banks vary permanently on a higher level than the
dependence coefficients with the Asian banks. Except for the crisis period in 2008, the
Chinese and Japanese SIFIs have significantly lower coefficients with the Western banks.
Unexpectedly, after three years of lower dependence, the tail dependence across all regions
increased sharply in 2015 and the Japanese banks yield higher tail dependence coefficients
with all other banks than for any sample period prior.
The focus now lies on the copula-implied lower tail dependence from equation (5) being
defined in the interval [0, 1] which measures the dependence in the lower left quadrant of
a bivariate distribution. This approach is based on the copula dependence parameters of
the one-factor model αi. Whereas Chen and Nasekin (2017) analyze the copula-implied
dependence coefficients of non-central banks on the central institution for each year, Oh
and Patton (2017a) apply the approach presented in section 2.2 which considers the de-
pendence parameters for each SIFI on the systemic factor. Then, using the estimated
marginal parameters from table 1 and according to the Skew t− t distributional assump-
tion for the conditional copula in (18), the degrees of freedom of the systemic factor for
each year are set equal for FZ and Fε. Hence, this setting guarantees equal tail indices
for Z and ε which avoids boundary results but enables to calculate the copula-implied
tail dependence coefficient by the procedure shown in section 2.2. The resulting copula-
implied lower tail dependence matrices for each year are given in figure 6.
Figure 6 clearly shows an highly interconnected financial system in 2007 which became
pertubated in 2008 with sharply increasing tail dependence within the UK and European
banking sector with average coefficient within the European banking sector of around
0.92. While in 2009 the tail dependence in Europe decreased essentially, the US banks’
tail dependencies increased again until 2010/2011 when contemporarily the European
banks peaked at maximal lower tail dependence coefficients for BNP Paribas (0.945) and
Societe Generale (0.949). This development is probably triggered by the European debt
crisis and while the crisis slowed down over the periods from 2012 to 2014, almost all
lower tail dependence coefficients decreased. Finally in 2014, all regions reached lowest
clustered coefficients in 2014 over the entire observation period with an average tail de-
pendence for USA (0.61), UK (0.58), China (0.169), Europe (0.813) and Japan (0.167)
conditional on the respective region of origin. Whereas the overall tail dependence in 2014
was 0.451, it sharply increased in 2015 up to 0.639 being higher than in 2008 (0.624). The
origin-clustered tail dependence coefficients rose heavily compared to the previous years
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for USA (0.758), UK (0.801), China (0.461), Europe (0.880) and Japan (0.357).3 Again,
as in figure 5, the Asian banks are subject to significantly lower tail dependence coeffi-
cients which, at an overall perspective, show the relative delimitation of the Asian from
the Western banking sector and potentially suggest the Asian banks to be more stable
against system-wide shocks. Still, it is to take into account that the coefficients for the
Asian banks increased sharply in 2015 which, together with the results from figure 5,
implies an higher interconnectedness between the SIFI banks on a worldwide level.
The main results from figure 5 and 6 are consistent with the findings of Chen et al.
(2017) and Chen and Nasekin (2017) who analyze empirical and copula-implied tail de-
pendence coefficients in a network-based factor copula model approach. In Chen and
Nasekin (2017) the copula-implied tail dependence is investigated conditional on central
nodes that represent those SIFIs which hold a larger potential for an overall tail risk. The
obtained copula-implied tail dependence matrices rank on slightly lower range than the
results from Oh and Patton (2017a) who calculated the lower (0.94) and upper (0.09) tail
dependence coefficients for the S&P100 index from April 2008 until December 2010 con-
taining 18 financial industry companies. Since their systemic risk analysis concentrates on
the S&P100 index which only considers US companies, their setting completely isolates
geographical clustering which together with the different observation period and different
common factor is responsible for the higher lower tail dependence coefficient for the US
financial industry.
Now, this section will analyze the copula parameters estimated by the log-likelihood func-
tion (48) on the factor copula density (46) which has to be solved numerically according to
section 3.2. After obtaining the results from the numerical integration and optimization,
the factor copula is simulated first which is applied on the inverse Skew t − t distribu-
tion using the estimated degree of freedom and skewness parameters and rescaled with
the mean effect and GARCH effect from the GARCH model (19). The resulting simu-
lated returns are now used for the further analysis. A copula dependence parameter αi|j
describes the dependence between the returns Zi on Zj. The results for this part are
estimated for twofold directions. On the one hand, the copula dependence parameters are
estimated for the system returns conditional on the each SIFI bank. On the other hand,
the other direction is considered, i.e. the copula dependence parameters conditioning the
simulated SIFI returns on the system returns according to equation (14) are obtained in
a simultaneous estimation.
The first setting analyzes the financial system exposure to each SIFI bank which directly
3Note that the color scale at the right-side of each year’s plot in figure 6 varies and hence the figures
are to interpret conditional on the different scale interval.
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Figure 2: Copula Dependence parameters for the system returns conditional on the SIFI
returns from 2007 until 2015
addresses to the too-big-to-fail topic. The results for nine years are plotted in figure 2.
Across all institutions, the dependence parameter for the financial system increased in
2008 and also varies on high level during the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and
2011 expressing higher systemic risk held by each institution compared to quieter years.
While the sensitivity of the financial system on the SIFI banks decreases continuously
from 2012 to 2014, it again sharply peaks in 2015 pointing to an higher systemic impor-
tance of each SIFI bank in the most recently observed period.
Whereas the average factor copula parameter in 2014 was around 0.584, it reached 0.733
in 2015 which is approximately as high as in 2008 (0.731) showing that the financial
system again reached a dependence structure that is similar to the dependence in the
crisis period. However, as there was no severe system-wide financial crisis in 2015, the
dependence structure might have been even stronger if 2015 was a crisis period. Across
the entire observation periods, the system was most vulnerable to European banks and in
particular, to BNP Paribas (0.901 on average), Credit Agricole (0.878), Societe Generale
(0.903), Deutsche Bank (0.872) and the ING Group (0.871). During the quieter period
from 2012 to 2014 all European banks lowered their dependencies from 0.88 down to 0.80,
except for Santander which continued growing from 0.81 up to 0.86.4
While US banks represented especially high systemic risk in 2010 and 2015 with values
in the latter period for JP Morgan (0.781) and Citigroup (0.793), British banks peaked
in 2008, 2010 and 2015 when Barclays obtained values such as 0.905, 0.898 and 0.862, re-
4This development of Santander, for instance, is not displayed by figure 3 in which Santander reduces
its dependence instead.
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Figure 3: Copula Dependence parameters for the SIFI returns conditional on the system
returns from 2007 until 2015
spectively. Even though, the Asian bank range on average between 0.3 and 0.4, the sharp
increase in 2015 additionally stresses the risen systemic risk associated by all SIFIs. While
both, Chinese and Japanese banks obtained values around 0.17 in 2014, the parameter
values peaked in 2015 at around 0.45 and 0.36, respectively. These results in total imply
an increased systemic importance among all SIFI banks in the most recent period.
The analysis now turns around the exposure direction and investigates the dependence of
each SIFI bank on the financial system which is rather referred to the too-interconnected-
to-fail topic. The corresponding results for nine years are plotted in figure 3. Supposing
that the Lehman Brothers shock rendered in a systemic crisis, this factor copula param-
eter matrix shows how severely the SIFI banks would be exposed to a systemic event.
Again 2007 and 2008, shows risen factor copula parameters among all banks. While the
parameters from figure 2 and 3 differ in level and changes from year to year, the overall
pattern does not change significantly.5 Certainly, some values might differ in level and
periodwise change but still, it holds that the years 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2015 yield the
highest factor copula parameters. In contrast to figure 2 the absolute difference between
the parameters for the US and European banks is significantly lower (by approximately
0.1) implying that the vulnerability of US banks to the financial system is relatively higher
than vice versa. The opposite holds for the European banks which would potentially affect
the financial system more severely than the financial system would affect them. Credit
Suisse however, reached 0.923 in 2008, the highest value that period among all banks but
afterwards continuously reduced its dependence on the system and while the dependen-
5Note again, that the color bar at the right-hand side of the plots is differently scaled.
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cies of the other European banks varies between 0.86 and 0.933 in 2015, Credit Suisse
obtained a much lower level of 0.80. BNP Paribas and Societe Generale, each provide
three times the highest overall dependence parameter. These results are supported by
Chen and Nasekin (2017) who found BNP, Credit Agricole and Societe Generale to be
exposed to high tail dependence even when conditioning on a non-central node. Among
the US banks, there is a high variation in the exposures to the system. That is, Bank
of America in 2007, Morgan Stanley in 2009, Wells Fargo in 2010, JP Morgan in 2011,
and 2014, Citigroup in 2008, 2012, 2013 and 2015 yielded the highest values among the
US banks with extrema at around 0.83 in 2015. Among the British banks, Barclays rep-
resented again the highest dependence on the system, though HSBC and Royal Bank of
Scotland yield similarly high values (on average around 0.80 for the three mentioned). For
most years, the British and European banks barely differ much in terms of level. Apart
from the Western SIFIs, the Chinese banks again rank on profoundly lower levels but
with dependence on the systemic factor in 2015 (0.50 on average) ranging higher than in
2008. Japanese banks instead only fluctuate around their overall average values (around
0.3) in 2015 whereas their systemic importance in figure 2 rose beyond their average. At
the end, these results show an increasing sensitivity of all SIFIs to the systemic factor
implying that the financial system reached a higher interconnectedness making the SIFIs
more affected by a potential systemic extreme event.
5.3 Results on systemic risk measures
This analysis will present the results for the risk measures introduced in section 4 ob-
tained from the simulated return series. As the focus of this work mainly lies on the
potential impact of the financial system on SIFI banks, the systemic risk is measured by
the vulnerability of each institution to the system.
Given the factor copula model from equation (14) the VaR and the ES are calculated
from the simulated returns for each SIFI and displayed in table 3 and 4. Since these iso-
lated risk measures do not provide much power for identifying systemic risk in financial
institutions, this section concentrates on the conditional risk measures which impose a
stressed event on the systemic factor.
Table 3 lists the VaR estimates of all SIFIs from 2007 until 2015. In line with results from
empirical research, 2008 shows an especially severe condition to the US banks, such that
Citigroup and Morgan Stanley with -10.3% and -9.1% at 95% VaR. During the sovereign
debt crisis in Europe in 2011 particularly BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Societe Generale,
Unicredit and ING Group suffered according to their VaR estimates which ranked as the
largest in absolute terms from 2010 until 2012. While the VaR in 2013 and 2014 moved
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down to low pre-crisis level of 2007, the VaR estimates sharpened in 2015 with British
and European banks yielding the highest values in absolute terms.
As expected, the corresponding Expected Shortfall estimates show a similar pattern with
particularly severe periods for British banks, i.e. Barclays leading the list in 2008 and
2010, the Royal Bank of Scotland yielding the largest negative values in 2009 and 2013
and Standard Chartered in 2015. While Standard Chartered’s ES estimates used to vary
below the average ES, it almost doubled from 2014 to 2015. While BNP, Credit Agricole
and Societe Generale had, together with Unicredit, the absolute highest ES values in 2008,
those three banks outperformed Deutsche Bank, Unicredit, ING and Santander as well as
Standard Chartered and Bank of China in 2015. Most of the banks obtained higher ES
estimates in 2015 than in 2013 and 2014.
The next measure for systemic risk, the Exposure ∆CoVaR (ExCoVaR) becomes more
and more applied in research on systemic risk such as in Pagano and Sedunov (2014).
This measure gives an intuition on how much a single institution is affected by a system
downturn as stated by equation 53. The VaR and ES for 2008 emphasized the severely
adverse returns of the US banks in particular, the ExCoVaR though quantifies the impact
of a market downturn on the individual VaR levels. Table 5 gives the individual exposures
on an adverse market move from median state to market returns conditional on their 95%
and 99% VaR estimates. Although, 2008 is characterized as the most severe crisis year by
highest losses given VaR and ES, the ExCoVaR obtains its maximum value in 2009 for the
Royal Bank of Scotland (-8.477). The case of RBS in 2009 obviously shows the different
nature of the ExCoVaR compared to the VaR and ES. On the one hand, 2008 generated
the highest total losses, on the other hand, the ExCoVaR implies that an adverse market
movement would have hit a few banks more severely in 2009 than in 2008. This relation
can be stated clearer when drawing a comparison between the differences in the averages
of the 2008 and 2009 VaR and ExCoVaR. While the average 2008 and 2009 95% VaR
yields -5.76 and -3.66 respectively, the corresponding averages for the ExCoVaR are -5.04
and -4.16 implying that the SIFI banks would have suffered from an equivalent systemic
shock in 2009 more harmful than one could deduce from the VaR and ES values. Those
discoveries underline the significance of risk measures conditioning one market participant
on a severe event of another market participant.
Similar to the ExCoVaR, the Marginal Expected Shortfall measures the institution-
specific exposure to the distressed financial system. Figure 4 illustrates the MES estimates
from table 6 for nine years with each year having two values, the 95% quantile listed first,
the 99% quantile second. As described in section 4 the MES also holds as measure for
the risk contribution of bank i’s idiosyncratic risk to the financial system’s overall risk
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Figure 4: Marginal Expected Shortfall at 95% and 99% quantiles for 2007-2015
(Acharya et al., 2017). Unsurprisingly the banks ranked highest at the ExCoVaR are also
skyrocking the MES estimates, though it should be noticed that the risk contribution of
different institutions to the overall systemic risk varies from the findings of the ExCoVaR.
Hence, the MES relatively stresses the systemic sensitivity on JP Morgan’s, Wells Fargo’s
and HSBC’s idiosyncratic risks in 2008 compared to the previous risk measures. That
is, setting the MES into relation to the ExCoVaR, it shows that those banks’ risk taking
contribute to the overall systemic risk relatively stronger than implied by the ExCoVaR.
For the year 2009 the MES distributes relatively higher sensitivity to Goldman Sachs, the
Bank of China and the Deutsche Bank in comparison to the ExCoVaR.
The analysis of Acharya et al. (2017) concentrates on the predictability of systemic risk
by conditional risk measures such as the ES and the MES. Thereby, the MES provides
significant predictive power for those companies with the most extreme tail events during
the financial crisis from 2007 until 2009 found within the frames of an OLS regression and
a Tobit analysis. In the comparative analysis of Benoit et al. (2013) the MES outperforms
the ∆CoVaR by assessing their power of identifying an increase in systemic risk at the
example of Lehman Brothers.
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6 Conclusion
This work investigates systemic risk in financial institutions for the most systemically im-
portant banks from pre-crisis period 2007 until 2015. Firstly, this analysis focuses on the
factor copula parameters which provide an adequate estimation for the individual insti-
tution’s dependence on the systemic factor. Subsequently, further dependence measures
are proposed based on the factor-copula model but also estimated by a purely empirical
approach. The following derivation of the factor-copula model yields a copula density
function which on the one hand, allows for flexible constructions with different distribu-
tional choices and on the other hand, provides a suitable framework for high-dimensional
estimation. The latter comes from the dimension reduction property of the factor model.
This framework considers a Skew t − t one-factor copula model which produces asym-
metric and tail dependence that achieves a better fit to the financial data. Numerical
methods are then applied to solve the maximum likelihood estimation in order to sim-
ulate the return series on which basis the estimation of the risk measures takes place.
At this final stage, this analysis focuses on the systemic risk measure of the Exposure
∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and the MES of Acharya et al. (2017) to
examine the exposure of the financial institution to a system-wide shock of the financial
sector.
According to the factor copula parameters, they illustrate higher dependence structures
during crisis periods around 2008 and 2011 whereas the dependence decreases essentially
after the European debt crisis prior an renewed increase in 2015. Since 2015 is not sub-
ject to an adverse economic development compared to the prior years, the estimates imply
that the interconnectedness within the financial sector increased without moving into a
tail event. This is backed by estimates which are based on the factor copula (Oh and
Patton, 2017a) but also by the nonparametric empirical tail dependence coefficients of
Schmidt and Stadtmüller (2006). Deviations between the empirical tail dependence and
the copula-implied tail dependence coefficients might be due to variation in the degrees
of freedom and the skewness parameter which is circumvented by the nonparametric em-
pirical measure.
When measuring systemic risk the ExCoVaR and the MES are to prefer over the isolated
measures VaR and ES by financial institutions and regulators according to their robust-
ness and possible predictive power (Idier et al., 2014). While the VaR and the ES assign
higher values to the American banks in 2008, the MES shows an relatively higher exposure
of British and European banks compared to the corresponding VaR and ES estimates.
This being said, the ExCoVaR and the MES prove their importance by assessing systemic
risk instead of individual maximal loss estimation of VaR and ES. The conditional risk
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measures clearly show the relative high overall exposure of the European SIFIs across
all sample periods whereas the US and British banks obtained the highest values during
the financial crisis periods. The topic of too-big-to-fail is connected to the nature of the
MES, which is driven by larger bank sizes that might be responsible for the relatively
high systemic risk measures of the Asian institutions in relation to their comparably low
dependence coefficients.
Since all measures estimated within this work agree to an increase of the overall systemic
risk in 2015, this analysis should become extended by more recent data. The higher de-
pendence measured by the factor copula parameters and the tail dependencies directly
addresses to the topic of too-interconnected-to-fail. Subsequent research might apply
multi-factor copula models to identify heterogeneous dependence with different drivers
for systemic instability and individual vulnerability. Future research may also connect
to the various and frequently trending analysis on risk measure extensions to study the
capability of systemic risk measures, such as the MES, to provide appropriate predictions
on systemic tail events.
Apart from the methodology itself, the majority of systemic risk analyses base their esti-
mations on equity and CDS data while option price data may offer opportunities for more
reliable predictive modeling of systemic risk measures.
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7 Figures and Tables
Index SIFI Firm Size Debt Ratio Bucket Country
1 JP MORGAN CHASE 21.506 0.261 4 U.S.
2 BANK OF AMERICA 21.446 0.302 2 U.S.
3 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 19.499 0.095 1 U.S.
4 CITIGROUP 21.359 0.300 3 U.S.
5 GOLDMAN SACHS 20.624 0.509 2 U.S.
6 MORGAN STANLEY 20.501 0.417 2 U.S.
7 STATE STREET 19.106 0.153 1 U.S.
8 WELLS FARGO 20.980 0.183 1 U.S.
9 ROYAL BANK OF SCTL 21.588 0.252 1 U.K.
10 BARCLAYS 21.604 0.286 3 U.K.
11 HSBC 21.682 0.127 4 U.K.
12 STANDARD CHARTERED 20.136 0.187 1 U.K.
13 BANK OF CHINA 21.200 0.160 1 China
14 ICBC 21.508 0.089 1 China
15 CHINA CON.BANK 21.281 0.092 1 China
16 BNP PARIBAS 21.684 0.136 3 France
17 CREDIT AGRICOLE 21.489 0.211 1 France
18 SOCIETE GENERALE 21.184 0.139 1 France
19 DEUTSCHE BANK 21.630 0.200 3 Germany
20 UNICREDIT 20.929 0.360 1 Italy
21 ING GROEP 21.156 0.103 1 Netherlands
22 SANTANDER 21.158 0.368 1 Spain
23 NORDEA BANK 20.476 0.326 1 Sweden
24 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP N 20.744 0.339 2 Switzerland
25 UBS GROUP 21.008 0.251 1 Switzerland
26 MITSUBISHI UFJ 21.533 0.159 2 Japan
27 MIZUHO 21.247 0.233 1 Japan
28 SUMITOMO.MITSUI 21.044 0.125 1 Japan
Note: The Debt ratio gives the ratio of total debt to total asset, and the bank size, as log value
of total assets denominated in the USD, are shown as their mean value during time period (2007-
2015). The buckets assigned by BCBS correspond to required level of additional common equity
loss absorbency as a percentage of risk-weighted assets from 3.5% (Bucket 5), 2.5%(Bucket 4),
2.0%(Bucket 3), 1.5%(Bucket 2) to 1%(Bucket 1).
Table 2: Summary information on systemically important financial institutions
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Figure 5: Empirical Tail Dependence coefficients for the SIFIs for 2007-2015
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Figure 6: Copula-implied Tail Dependence coefficients for the SIFIs for 2007-2015
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